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Depreciation is one of the tools of financial
management. Its application, in methodology and purpose, is
a key that reveals not only the skill of financial manage-
ment, but also much of the philosophy upon which such manage-
ment is predicated. Depreciation is used in the business
world as one of the determinants of costs, and hence of
profits, and for the restoration of capital impairment. Its
universal application and acceptance in industry makes
difficult the realization that depreciation has been generally
accepted as a charge against income only within the last
fifty years. Tills is not surprising, however, when one
considers the two prime motivations in cost determination,
namely the rapid development of the art of accounting, and
the vulnerability of profits to increasing taxation. The
latter made a determination of costs necessary, while the
former made the determination possible.
Depreciation is an important vehicle of expression
for economic and accounting theory as well as management
principles. Even government philosophy is expressed by means
of depreciation provisions in acts governing internal revenue
and industrial mobilization. While the concept of
depreciation is an accepted part of financial management in
'Joel Dean, Managerial Economics (New York: Prentice-
Hall Inc.), 3rd Ed., 1954, p. 16.
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the business world, it is interesting to note that within the
United States Government, the depreciation concept is not so
generally accepted in its business and financial operations.
There are exceptions to this as will be noted later. Although
tremendous strides have been made in the last forty years
(particularly since 1950) in Government fiscal administration,
no clear policy as to the use, basis, or application of
depreciation has been formulated in either the Executive or
Congressional Branch of the Government.
As of this writing, there is considerable activity
at high Executive and Congressional levels seeking to clarify
the concept of depreciation and its application to Department
of Defense activities under particular circumstances.
Legislation has already been introduced^ that provides for
depreciation of machinery and equipment used under working
capital funds. Enactment of this legislation will start
profound changes in the financial management of the Department
of Defense in various phases of budgeting, funding, and
accounting, as well as in the appropriation process. With
the application of depreciation to military industrial fund
activities legislatively imminent, it is the purpose of
this study to highlight the depreciation problem and to
consider it in relation to military Industrial Funds,
particularly in the Naval Shipyard area.
dkt this time two bills, S. 2595 and H.R. IO83O have
been introduced by the 85th Congress. See Appendix B.
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CHAPTER I
DEPRECIATION AS A FACTOR IN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
The Functions of Depreciation
In financial management there are several indices
by which to Judge the soundness and health of an organization.
One of the better known of these is the factor of overhead,
the so-called burden of a business. In Government as in the
business world, overhead rates are a clinical indication of
efficiency, effectiveness, and economy in operations. In
industry, a rising overhead, like the temperature of a
patient, is watched carefully, and is usually a signal for
corrective action to be taken. To understand the behavior
of overhead, its composition must be determined. Funda-
mentally, overhead costs include all elements other than the
prime costs of direct material and direct labor. There
are many degrees of refinement in cost classifications which
are of interest to management. To the customer, however,
the only cost of interest is the total cost to him. In
this sense there is no priority among the elements of cost,
except that those included in overhead should have greater
management concern and attention because they are more
difficult to control and justify.
Taking for granted that prime costs are controllable,
harnessed a3 they can be by scientific management concepts
and production control technique, management's greatest
3
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challenge Is In the area of overhead costs. One of the most
important of these costs is depreciation.
Military industrial funds do not tre.it depreciation
as a cost of work. Consequently, depreciation is not
included in the overhead rates of military industrial
activities. Yet the overhead problem has become a serious
concern to military management, even without the burden of
depreciation. The reason for this situation is the declining
productive workload in military installations vis-a-vis
the productive capacity of the plants required for mobilization
purposes. With overhead costs already reaching prohibitive
levels in many military industrial facilities, the addition
of depreciation costs would seem to be an unnecessary
aggravation of the problem. However, recognition of
depreciation as part of the burden of military industrial
enterprise appears inevitable in the continued refinement
and identification of military costs. With proper definition
and application, depreciation costing could well be a blessing
in disguise. It would provide funds for replacement of
obsolescent machinery and equipment, and would improve the
accounting of costs. The chief value of depreciation in
military industrial organizations, however, would be its
catalytic function in the exercise of management control.
The first consideration that would necessarily have
to be dealt with involves idle plant capacity and under-
absorbed facilities. This consideration will lead to some
"agonizing reappraisals," many of which are long overdue. If,
however, military industrial facilities are to continue
a(.
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operations, such reappraisals will have to be made,
realistically and soon. Depreciation per se is not a pre-
requisite to management control and reappraisal, but insofar
as it will focus attention on matters otherwise ignored, it
will be a valuable clue In diagnosing the ills of military
industrial management.
Having noted earlier that depreciation is an
important talisman in financial management, further clari-
fication i3 in order. In v/hat way would depreciation force
management to exercise more rigid control? Cost control
has already been noted. Depreciation's real function is to
replace capital consumed in operations so that the owner's
equity is not dwindled away. It is a means of capitalizing
an expense of operation. In military installations it would
serve to maintain the taxpayer's investment in defense
readiness. When depreciation reserves are established,
their expenditure will necessarily require management's
consideration as to proper utilization. The vehicle for
expenditure should be a capital budget, which in turn must
be predicated on long range planning. Questions must be
raised and answered as to:




In determining acceptable answers, other questions as to
useful life, periods of operation, methods of depreciation,
plant capacity, machine technology, utilization, and other
allied factors will arise.
((
These determinations must necessarily be made by top
management aided by local commands. The next question is
whether management is making such decisions now without the
benefit of depreciation reserves to prod the action.
The answer must be qualified. There is evidence in
various reports on field activities to indicate that many
military industrial installations are obsolete, ineffective,
inefficient, inadequate, and unnecessary. This condition
reflects primarily the difficulties of obtaining appropriations
as necessary for plant and equipment. From this point a
host of other difficulties may be found, most of which can
be attributed to a lack of managerial control and incentive.
As long as industrial -fund activities have to depend on
appropriations for plant equipment and improvement, so long
will the noted conditions exist. Given one step on the
ladder of capital control, such as a funded depreciation
reserve, management control in this area will come to life
and exercise its latent capabilities.
It should be recognized however that the existence
of a depreciation reserve will provide no carte blanche for
its expenditure. The justification for expenditures will
still be required, but the vagaries of appropriation funding
and control should not be included. At least this is the
hope of the proponents of funded depreciation. The evidence
indicates it is worth a try.
The problem of idle plant capacity has been faced
by industry for some years. It was first recognized and

treated by Henry H. Gantt^ whose theory was that idle plant
capacity should not be costed to the product. His influence
in cost accounting systems has had profound effect on the
American industrial scene. This effect is now being felt by
the military establishments in the Industrial Fund activities.
It is probable, however, that the effect of idle plant
capacity on overhead costs whether depreciated or not, has
not been fully appreciated by either local command or top
management. An example will serve to highlight the problem.
An Army repair depot, which accounted for depreciation based
on total plant capacity, reached an overhead rate that made
repair costs uneconomical. At least the costs appeared
uneconomical based on the criterion that repairs would not
be made if they exceeded 50$ of the replacement cost. Super-
ficially, it would appear that the use of depreciation in this
case was inimical to the best interests of the service.
Certainly waste occurred if repairable equipment was scrapped
because repair costs were excessive due to an overhead
hindered by depreciation. The fault however, was not in
costing depreciation, but in applying the depreciation cost
of idle plant capacity to current production. This of course
falls squarely in the area of management engineering and
coraptrollership, neither of which is exercised fully in
military installations. Idle plant capacity, which may
properly be identified as a mobilization reserve, can and
should be funded and treated separately. Statistical
3r. n. Owens, Management of Industrial Enterprises
(Horaewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 3rd Ed.,
1957), p. 22.

8depreciation costs should be appropriately maintained on
idle plant capacity, for proper accounting of such property.
However, the burden of idle plant capacity should never be
borne in current production costs for many obvious reasons.
From a management standpoint, depreciation on existing
industrial facilities will focus attention on facilities
where improvements may appropriately be made in plant layout
and capacity, and production processing. There is exten-
sive use of under-absorbed facilities which will be high-lighted
by the depreciation burden vis-a-vis productive returns.
Many military industrial plants expanded under war-time
pressures with little consideration of industrial engineering
precepts for plant capacities and layout, production flow,
etc. As long as these plants operate at capacity, the
effect of poor industrial engineering is minimized. With
workload reduced significantly, as ha3 been the case in
recent years, overhead costs are bloated by idle plant
capacity, poor lay-out, and inefficient processes. Job
order costs rise. Add to these conditions the effects of
obsolescence, and the resulting costs are such that military
industrial installations literally price themselves out of
business.
Depreciation is no panacea for all these conditions,
but insofar as it can serve to finance new equipment and to
purify the cost of work, it is essential to the economic
health and growth of military industrial enterprise.

CHAPTER II
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION INVOLVING DEPRECIATION
As regards depreciation of military industrial
equipment, there is a widely held premise to the effect that
the Congress does not support the depreciation concept in
Government enterprise. This premise is based on the fact
that Title IV of the National Security Act Amendments of 19^9,
Public Law ^16, 8lst Congress, 1st Session, did not spcifically
provide for depreciation in the establishment of military
industrial (working capital) funds. In a subsequent chapter3-
this matter will be dealt with in more detail. For the moment,
the purpose of this chapter is to establish the sense of the
Congressional expressions, which by implication or definition,
endorse the concept of depreciation for application in Govern-
ment
,
There are a number of clear expressions by the
Congress, both in legislation and legislative history, with
respect to depreciation. References to indirect costs and
overhead, which embrace depreciation, are also numerous.
While it is not the purpose of this paper to report all
Congressional action in this area, the following expressions
are cited to indicate that the position of Congress on the
matter of depreciation is well established.
The first legislation of interest is the Act of
March 2, 1907 (3^ Stat 1062) 2 which was the basis for the
l-See Chapter III, infra .
^Discussed more fully in Chapter IV, infra .
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replacement cost concept used b;> the Ordnance Corps of the
Army. Two other early actions were the Act of May 4, 1911
(36 Stat 1267) and the Act of June 30, 1914 (38 Stat 413)
which are discussed below. The interesting thing to note
in connection with this early legislation is that the con-
cepts involved are quite advanced for the period. Depreciation
as a factor of cost accounting was just gaining recognition
in industry, while the art of cost accounting was even then
in its infancy. It is probable, however, that the growing
concern of the Congress with the sorry state of Federal
financial management in the early 1900' s is reflected by
these laws. This concern led to the establishment of the
Taft Commission in 1910, the work of which led to enactment
2
of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.
In the Act of May 4, 1911* Appropriations for the
Naval Service, the Congress provided
that hereafter, in fixing the cost of work under the
various Naval Appropriations, the direct and indirect
charges incident thereto shall be included in such
cost: and provided further, that the Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts shall keep the money accounts of the Naval
Establishment in such a manner as to show such charges
and shall report the same annually for the information
of Congress.
3
Subsequently, in the Act of June 30, 1914, the Congress
stateds
Hereafter there shall be charged against the several
appropriations for the support of the Naval Establish-
ment the overhead charges incident to upkeep and to
2jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., New York, 1956), PP. 16-18.
3U.S. Statutes 36 Stat 1267 (1911).
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Industrial work at Navy Yards and Stations. The total
sum so charged shall be distributed In accordance v/lth
the work done In the various yards and stations in
order that the cost of work may be determined.
4
These Congressional references to "indirect
charges," and "overhead charges" in industrial work, are
considered important as they show Congressional awareness
of costs in these areas. Even in those days, an accounting
interpretation of the phrases would have included depreciation.
It is interesting to note that the Congress, then as now,
was endeavoring to determine the cost of work. There is
no indication, however, that the Navy ever considered or
included depreciation as one of the costs of doing work.
The Economy Act of 1932 (47 Stat 417) set the stage
for depreciation as a proper charge on inter-agency work.
Section 601 of this Act states on Reimbursements for Inter-
agency services that "any agency may procure from another, and
shall pay all or part of the estimated or actual cost as
determined by the selling agency."
In a case between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
and the Mississippi River Commission, 5 which objected to
the high overhead rates and depreciation charges therein,
the matter was referred to the Comptroller General for
decision. On this case the District Engineer's letter to
the Comptroller General stated: "The overhead charged includes
all indirect cost such as depreciation on buildings,
4U.S. Statutes 38 Stat 413 (1914).
-^An agency of the Soil Conservation Service under
the Department of Agriculture.
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maintenance .... Such charges are authorized by the
Chief of Engineers.""
Citing Section 601, Economy Act of 1932, the
Comptroller General's decision stated that:
There may be included in the "actual cost an amount
representing indirect, or "overhead" expenses commonly
recognized as elements of cost such as depreciation,
maintenance, general office expense, etc.
7
This decision is of particular interest in that it
recognizes depreciation of real property. There are a
number of other indications that the General Accounting
Office fully endorses depreciation of Government plant and
equipment as a cost of operations.
Another legal milestone which established a base
for the recognition of depreciation was the Government
Corporation Control Act of 1945. This Act, P.L. 248
(31 USC 841) provided for financial control by several
means including:
1. Business type budgets
d. Audits in accordance with the principles and
procedures applicable to commercial corporate
transactions, and
3. A report on the impairment of capital.
As a result of this act, Government corporations fund
depreciation reserves, as appropriate to their needs and
Decisions of the Comptroller General of the United
States, Vol. 22, p. 78. July 1, 1953 to June ^0, 1954.
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954).
7Ibid ., p. 74.
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operations. The Tennessee Valley Authority is a notable
example. In auditing tae TVA operation, the Government
Accounting Office has had considerable difficulty in drawing
the line between the replacement of capital assets due to
o
impairment, and the expansion of facilities. Expansion
of facilities requires specific Congressional authorization.
Yet expansion of facilities, or at least expansion of
capability or capacity, is likely to occur in the replacement
of any old equipment by new products. The depreciation
reserves, funded by power revenues and other sources of
income, make possible the routine replacement of equipment
and impaired capital investment. But there has been no
suggestion that the depreciation reserves be diverted away
from TVA management control.
In 1950 the 8lst Congress made several important
contributions to the depreciation concept in revolving funds.
The first of these was the Act of June 29, 1950, Public
I*aw 583, 8lst Congress, 1st Session, which established a
working capital fund for the National Bureau of Standards.
This law states in part:
Reimbursements
. . .
shall include handling and related
charges; reserves for depreciation of equipment and
accrued leave; and building construction and alterations
directly related to the work for which reimbursement
is made.
9
^House Document No. 178, 85th Congress, 1st Session,
Audit Report of Tennessee Valley Authority for the Fiscal Year
ended June 30* 1956. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1957).
9u.S. Statutes 64 Stat 279.
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Congress again expressed itself very clearly on the
matter of depreciation in Public Law 656 (64 Stat 408) of
August 4, 1950. This law, which provides for the financing
of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, states specifically
that the accounting system will make provision for the
replacement of capitalized equipment and other fixed assets
through the maintenance of adequate depreciation reserves.
Because of the ideal aspects of this law as relates to
revolving fund operations, it is covered in greater detail
in another part of this study.
As if to climax its efforts for the year, Congress
passed the Budget and Accounting Act of 1950. In addition
to this significant action in the accounting field, Part II,
Title I of the Act contains a Congressional Declaration of
Policy which states t
It is the policy that the accounting of the Government
provide full disclosure of the results of financial
operations, adequate financial information needed in
the management of operations, and the form and expression
of the Budget, and effective control over income,
expenses, funds, property and other assets.
H
The Congress clearly expressed its views on the
matter again when the depreciation practices of the Corps of
Engineers were endorsed by the Act of July 27, 1953.
Identified as Public Law 153, 83rd Congress, 1st Session,
this act established a revolving fund for the maintenance
and operation of plant and equipment of the Corps of
lOsee Chapter IV, supra.
1XU.S. Statutes 67 Stat 197.
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Engineers used in civic works functions. The pertinent
part of the law which endorses depreciation reads as follows:
The Secretary of the Army is authorized to provide
capital for the fund by capitalizing the present
inventorie s, plant and equipment of the civil works
functions of the Corps of Engineers. The fund shall be
credited with reimbursements on advances for the
cost of equipment, facilities, and services furnished,
at rates which shall include charges for overhead and
related expenses, depreciation of plant and equipment,
and accrued leave. 12
A student of legislation will pause to wonder why
the Corps of Engineers was not included under the provisions
of Public Law 216 as regards industrial funds. It must be
noted, however, that the Corps of Engineers, with its "pork
barrel" legislation, has always enjoyed special Congressional
attention and legislation. It should be significant, however,
to the Department of Defense and the Military Departments
that as of 1953.> the Congress specifically authorized
depreciation in a military revolving fund.
In addition to legislation which either provides a
base for depreciation or expressly calls for its use, there
are items in legislative history which endorse the concept of
depreciation in Government activities of a commercial or
industrial nature. Two of these are cited in the following:
The Navy appropriation, Service Wide Operations for
195^j contained an amount of $50,000 for the replacement of
equipment in the Defense Printing Service which is operated
by the Navy. The amount was deleted by the Sub -committee




for reimbursement of all costs. The Sub-committee's viewpoint,
as expressed by the report is as follows:
The Operation is financed under the Navy industrial
Fund on a job order basis; costs of individual Jobs are
billed out to those requesting the service. The
individual fund operation was initially capitalized
with appropriated funds, and according to its admin-
istrative charter, is supposed to be self sustaining,
with the single exception of replacement of capital
equipment. The committee fails to understand the
concept unless all costs, including depreciation of
equipment are included in billings for services rendered
as any business operation would have to do. The $50,000
requested has therefore been deleted. 13
It is interesting to note that while the Committee
endorsed the principle of depreciation for machinery and
equipment, it entertained some other definition for
capital equipment. Indeed, it may be assumed that $50,000
is not considered a capital expenditure in the eyes of the
Committee. Clearly, there is need for definition.
During the hearings before the House Appropriations
Committee on the Department of the Army Appropriations for
1957* the Assistant Secretary of the Array for Financial
Management Mr. C. R. Davis made a statement endorsing
depreciation in the form of a replacement cost to be recouped
from customers of the Army Industrial Fund activities.
Referring to the historical Army practice of funding for
replacements, Mr. Davis stated:
It is a sound management technique designed to insure
the use of modern efficient machinery and equipment with
^House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 1st
Session, Report No. 680. (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1956). June 27, 1953.
((I
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resulting lowered costs of production. The endorsement
of this principle by the committee would be greatly
appreciated. 14
The reaction of the Appropriations Committee to the Davis
testimony, as noted in the committee report was as follows:
The committee endorses the principle that replacement
of machinery and equipment, other than major capital
items, consumed in producing material and services
under industrial funding should be included in costs
and recouped from customers. 15
In reviewing Congressional expressions on depreciation,
indirect costs, and overhead, as well as those covering the
general budget and accounting field, it is apparent that
the chief concern of Congress is the absence of cost control
at the agency level. The primary issue is not Congressional
control of the purse, but rather it is agency control of the
funds provided by Congress. If true financial management
control existed in the operating agencies of Government, it
is reasonable to believe that the Congress would be content
to devote its efforts to policy matters and delve less into
managerial accounting of Government funds. In the broadening
application of the revolving fund concept to Government
operations, Congress is offering agency management an
opportunity to exercise financial management control. This
control can be fully achieved and exercised only by adoption
•^Hearings before the Sub-committee of the Committee
on Appropriations. House of Representatives, 84th Congress,
2nd Session on Department of the Army Appropriations for 1957.
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 10.
^u.S. House of Representatives, 84th Congress, 2nd
Session, Report No. 2104, May, 1956. (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1956).
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of modern industrial management methods. Top management
needs the information that can be provided by a full accounting
of costs, not only for its managerial decisions, but for
furnishing information to Congress. Congress has always
endorsed such improvements in the area of financial manage-
ment.
Based on the foregoing, those seeking policy
guidance on the matter of depreciation can only conclude
that the Congress fully supports the funding of depreciation
charges in revolving fund operations.
«<
CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEPRECIATION POLICY IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Background
With the preceding background of Congressional
interest and expression relative to indirect costs, including
depreciation, attention can now be focused on the legis-
lation which established military industrial funds. Known
as Title IV of the National Security Act Amendments of 19^9*
Public Law 216, 8lst Congress, 1st Session, this Act was
an outgrowth of the first Hoover Commission report. The
Commission, established in 19^7 by the Congress, was given
authority to "study and investigate the present organization
and method of operation of the entire structure of the
Executive Branch of the Government. 11 Otherwise the
objectives of the Commission were vague and not clearly
established. In the confusion, Mr. Hoover wisely restricted
the Commission's functions to fact finding, upon which
recommendations relating to efficiency and economy could be
predicated.
The principal contributions of the first Hoover
Commission were the improved financial management concepts
for the Department of Defense, and the concept of
performance budgeting for use throughout the Government.





by enacting Public Law 216, 8lst Congress, 1st Session which:
1. established the Comptroller Organization
throughout the Department of Defense,
2. provided for working capital funds to support
industrial operations in the three services and,
3. called for the use of performance type budgeting.
Based on the language of the law, and prior to
implementation of the legislation, there would appear to be
no doubt that depreciation is an implicit factor in both
working capital funds and performance budgeting. The
objective of each of these developments was to provide for
a more business-like approach to financial operations in
the defense area, including a determination of the costs of
operations. It would appear that such an important factor as
depreciation could not logically have been excluded.
Section 405 of Public Law 216 states in sub-paragraph (a)
In order more effectively to control and account for the
cost of programs and work performed . ". . the Secretary
of Defense is authorized to require establishment of
working capital funds . . . for the purpose of
(1) financing; inventories of such stores, supplies,
materials, and equipment as he may designate; and
(2) providing working capital for such commercial





Such funds shall be (1) charged, when appropriate,
with the cost of stores, supplies, materials, and
equipment procured or otherwise acquired, manufactured,
repaired, issued, and consumed .... (italics mine.)
Sub-paragraph (d) states:
The Secretary of Defense is authorized to provide
capital for such working capital funds by capitalizing
inventories on hand





Eased on the underlined portions of the quotations
above it can he seen that while depreciation was not
identified per se, the objectives could not be achieved
fully without its use. Depreciation is certainly an
important element of the cost of programs and work;
certainly it is cost of equipment consumed . Likewise it is
one of the continuing means of providing; working capital .
Perhaps some question exists as to the meaning of the terms
"inventory" and "equipment." Standard dictionaries agree
that the term "inventory" means a list of goods or property
and may include parcels of land. True, its ordinary usage
usually embraces only items of material rather than capital
equipment, but the latter is not excluded. Likewise the
term "equipment" carries a service connotation of equipage,
small outfitting items; yet again by definition the term
embraces all items necessary to furnish services.
With respect to the functions of comptrollership and
performance budgeting established by the Act, the Comptroller
is directed, under the Secretary of Defense, to establish
and supervise the execution of "fiscal, cost, operating
and capital property accounting." Further, the Secretary
of Defense is to "account for and report, the cost of
performance of readily identifiable function and programs
and activities, with segregation of operating and capital
programs .
"
The burden of the foregoing discussion is to
indicate that there is an existing basis in law for the




Legislative History on Public Law 216
Public Law 216 (61 Stat 499, 5 USC Sup 171), which
established authority for the use of industrial funds in the
military departments, did not specifically prohibit funding
of depreciation. As noted previously, there is a strong
basis in the statute wording on which to base an inter-
pretation that depreciation should have been included as a
funded cost, when the Department of Defense established the
regulations for industrial funds, plant equipment and
facilities, as well as property (buildings and land) were
omitted from capitalization. As a consequence, depreciation
was not included among the items of cost. This determination
was made by the Secretary of Defense in accordance with the
authority given him by the law, With respect to buildings
and land no objection can be raised, since there is no wording
in the law relating to buildings and land. The term
"equipment" is used however, and in its broad general usage
plant equipment is implied. It can be extended to include
other facilities depending on definition.
By general understanding, the written determination
of which has not been found in research, the decision to
eliminate depreciation as a cost was based on a comment
found in the Armed Services Committee Hearing Report1 of the
House on the bill which became Public Law 216. This report
emphasizes the purpose of the industrial funds as being
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 8lst
Congress, 1st Session, Reorganizing Fiscal Management in the
National Military Establishment, Report No. 1064, , July 14, J-9^9
( Washington i U . S . ~ G6Vernmeht Printing Office, 1949)7
<l
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most effectively to control and account for the cost of
programs and work performed, to provide adequate,
accurate and current cost data which can be used as a
measure of efficiency, and to facilitate the most
economical administration and operation of military
departments.
In a description of the operations of industrial-type
activities, the report states:
All costs of the operation . . . would be paid
from the working-capital funds, utilizing standard,
accepted and approved commercial practices for the
distribution of direct and indirect costs to Jobs in
process.
Continuing, the report state st
when the work is completed, the plant will invoice the
cost to the ordering . . . agency . . . the invoice
charges would include items of cost for labor, material,
and current operating expenses. Items such as
allowances that normally are included by commercial
concerns for depreciation and taxes, as well as the
proration of military personnel expenditures may be
added statistically for comparison with similar
operations by private industry,
2
It is the last sentence of the foregoing quotation
that is considered to be the basis for excluding depreciation
costs. Admittedly, such an interpretation may be used, but
it can hardly be assumed that this one sentence negates the
intent of previous expressions which indicate that "indirect
costs" and "all costs" will be applied. It should also be
noted that the detailed record of testimony in the Hearings
of the House and Senate gives no word or indication that
any specific cost such as depreciation was to be excluded.
There is positive statement to the effect that actual costs




reimbursed. Since there is substantial testimony to baok up
other parts of the report prepared by staff writers, it
can only be assumed that the reference to depreciation was
staff editorial initiative rather than testimony in fact,
or legislative intent.
The Origin of a Depreciation Policy
The Department of Defense directive implementing
the establishment of military industrial funds specifically
exempted plant equipment from the capitalization of the
funds. 3 in establishing the industrial funds the Secretary
of Defense directed that
each fund shall consist of unexpended balances of cash
on deposit in the Treasury or its equivalent; accounts
receivable, stores of supplies, materials, and work in
process, finished goods; and all other current assets
pertaining to or acquired in the operations of the
establishments financed under the funds.
Because no capital assets were included in the capitalization
of the Industrial Funds, there was no provision made for
funding depreciation as an element of cost. However, a
statistical computation of depreciation was prescribed
for information purposes only.
The subject of depreciation continued under active
consideration within the Department of Defense. In a
memorandum dated 25 October 1950, prepared by Mr. H. W. Bordner,
Assistant Comptroller for Accounting Policy, Department of
Defense, the following questions were raised for study and
3Department of Defense publication, Regulations
Covering the Operation of Working-Capital Funds for Industrial




1. Should capital expenditures for plant and
equipment of industrial establishments in the Department of
Defense be financed from appropriations and be subject to
the normal budgetary controls of appropriated funds?
2. On the contrary, should the revolving funds used
to finance the working capital ... be used as a means of
funding depreciation on the plant and equipment of such
establishments, in order that replacements and new
acquisitions of plant and equipment may be financed from
3uch revolving funds to the extent that such funds are
available?
3. Should some other financing method be used?
4. Should depreciation on plant and equipment
. . .
be treated as a cost of work performed . . . ?
5. If so, should such depreciation be included in
costs actually billed to and reimbursed from appropriated
funds by the agencies ordering the work?
In the rationale of these questions, the memorandum
allowed that depreciation is an element of cost in the work
of DOD industrial establishments, just as in private
industry. Noting that depreciation is necessary in main-
taining the capital of a business from its revenues,
Mr. Bordner states that this reason for depreciation
accounting is not applicable to the Department of Defense.
Likewise, depreciation effects in the area of taxation,
^"This widely used abbreviation, as well as others
referring to Government agencies will be used for readability
purposes as considered appropriate. Refer to Appendix A for
a list of such abbreviations.
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which is of vital concern to private industry, is not a
consideration in government plants. The memorandum includes
other considerations such as (a) cost comparisons between
military agencies and private industry, (b) cost control,
(c) program costs, (d) the anomaly of costing depreciation
without funding for its (e) possible abuses in budgetary
processes by means of depreciation reserves, (f ) the
concentration of too much authority in the hands of manage-
ment at industrial activities (g) the cost of idle plant
capacity, and (h) the incompatibility of policies which
propose costing depreciation, but deny the use of reserves
for financing capital expenditures. Based on these con-
siderations, the following conclusions and recommendations
were reached:
1. Capital expenditures of industrial establishments
in the Department of Defense should be financed from
appropriated funds, subject to the usual methods of
budgetary control for such funds.
2. Depreciation on plant and equipment in use of
industrial establishments should be treated as an element
of cost, not merely on a statistical basis, but as an
element of cost to be paid from appropriations chargeable
for the cost of the end products or services.
3. This apparent inconsistency can be reconciled
by adoption of a practice requiring industrial establishments
to pay over the equivalent of depreciation provided to
miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury, or to reimbursements




expenditures for replacements and new items of plant equipment.
Mr. Bordner expressed preference for appropriation
reimbursement, so as to avoid duplicate costs of defense
through both capital expenditures and depreciation.
One particularly interesting part of the memorandum
is the disclosure that DOD opinion was to the effect that
it would be undesirable to depart from ordinary methods of
budgetary control over appropriated funds and the financing
of capital expenditures. This opinion was presumed to be in
consonance with Congressional opinion and intent.
Here then are drawn the classic outlines of the
problem—Congressional versus Executive control of expenditures.
The DOD opinion, expressed in the recommendation that
capital expenditures should be financed by appropriated
funds, is indeed politic in that it recognizes and seeks
to preserve Congressional supremacy in the control of the
purse.
The Bordner memorandum of 25 October 1950 is
important as the beginning of a Department of Defense policy
on the matter of depreciation. The development of this
policy continued. On 3 January 1952, a more detailed outline
of a plan for the capitalization of machinery and equipment,
with accounting and funding for depreciation, was submitted
to the Bureau of the Budget. In narrative form it proposed
that:
a. All machinery and equipment be included among
industrial fund assets. These assets were to be designated
<
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as "fixed capital" as distinguished from working capital.
b. Machinery and equipment attached to and originally
financed as part of buildings was to be excluded.
c. All additions and replacements of machinery and
equipment were to be financed from the industrial funds and
capitalized.
d. Land, buildings and improvements were not to be
included in the industrial funds.
Regarding accounting and funding for depreciation,
the plan proposed that:
a. Depreciation on machinery and equipment be
accrued as a cost subsequent to the initial capitalization
thereof on the industrial fund.
b. The industrial fund be reimbursed for depreciation
as a part of the total cost of work or services performed.
c. All reimbursement for depreciation be deposited
in an establishment fund, but that no separate depreciation
fund account be maintained.
d. The general cash account of each establishment
finance replacement of capital equipment, and that any cash
inadequacy be supplemented by allocation or appropriation as
appropriate
.
e. Any excess in cash accounts be recovered into a
cash reserve of the industrial fund as a whole.
The remainder of the plan covered retirements and
transfers of fixed capital items; budgetary control over
capital assets and expenditures, and various provisions for





The Bureau of the Budget did not find the plan
entirely satisfactory. In a memorandum reply to Mr. Bordner,
now Deputy Comptroller for Accounting Policy, Department of
Defense, the Bureau of the Budget advised that there were no
major objections to the plan, and no objections to prep-
aration of legislation to amend Title IV of Public Law 216.
Bubud support for the legislation was not unqualified,
however. Some difference of opinion existed as to whether
legislation should be permissive or mandatory. In the
area of idle plant capacity, there was also some disagree-
ment with Bordner f s plan for depreciation as expressed in
his earlier policy memorandum.
This, then, represents some of the thinking on the
question of depreciation as of early 1952. The DOD policy,
as expressed by the Bordner outline clearly supported the
concept of depreciation of machinery and equipment in both
costing and funding.
However, the Department of Defense did not take the
lead in establishing depreciation as a cost under industrial
funds. It did provide a vehicle of debate for the matter
among the military departments by means of the annual
proposed DOD legislative program. Within this avenue of
expression the Army, Navy and Air Force, have carried out a
spirited exchange of difference in opinion which to date has
been unresolved. In the following chapter, a resume of the
military department opinions is presented.
1
CHAPTER IV
MILITARY DEPARTMENT POSITIONS ON DEPRECIATION
The Army Position
With the establishment of Military Industrial Funds
in 1951j certain Army Technical Corps faced the loss of
depreciation reimbursements that had previously afforded
a hedge against obsolescence, and an important element of
managerial control. The practice of costing depreciation
had been pioneered by the Corps of Engineers and the Ordnance
Corps of the Army. In the case of the Ordnance Corps, with
its arsenals and repair depots, the depreciation concept
was identified as a replacement cost.
The Congressional action which opened the door for
this type of depreciation was the Act of March 2, 1907*
(34 Stat 1062, 31 USC 658). The Act stated:
The Chief of Ordnance, in conducting manufacturing or
similar operations, is authorized to charge any
indirect or general expense for labor or material
therefor against any of the appropriations authorizing
these operations, in such a manner as is most economical
and efficient, provided that the method adopted shall
show that each of such appropriations bears its ratable
share of the total amount of these expenses.
This legislation led to the establishment of a Shop Expense
Account in industrial activities of the Army Ordnance Corps.
The purpose of the Shop Expense Account was
(l) to distribute the overhead expenses to the costs
of orders in progress, and (2) to furnish a basis for




productive work whether scheduled or in the planning
stage.
1
Over the course of years, this flexible system
permitted the establishment of various auxiliary account
headings chargeable to the Shop Expense Account. Among these
was one entitled "Provision for Replacement of Machinery."
As stated by the Manual i*
the purchase of machinery for replacement of existing
manufacturing facilities may be charged to the Shop
Expense fund for the reason that such replacement is
in lieu of further maintenance ....
Authorization for such purchases did not include advanced
machinery for modernization or expansion purposes. This,
however, would appear to be a specious limitation, because
it is not usually possible to replace old machinery with
identical equipment. Regardless of how the regulations
were interpreted, the important point is that the Shop
Expense Account enabled the Ordnance Corps to program
replacements of machinery, and to anticipate deferred
maintenance costs on other large non-recurring expenses
related to machinery and equipment. The term depreciation
was not specifically used as an account title. The prin-
cipal reason for this was that the depreciation concept, with
an accrual carryover from year to year could not be
accommodated under the existing legal requirements of
•^-Ordnance Corps Manual, ORDM 6-23, Ordnance Corps
Stock Fund and Shop Expense Accounts
.
Sec. 401. [Wash-





appropriation accounting. The charges made under the
Provision for Replacement of Machinery were predicated on
the replacement plans budgeted for the year. Replacement
requirements were usually forecast three years in advance.
The amount charged in any one year was limited to 10 per
cent of the direct labor charges. Thus it functioned as a
variable cost, rather than as a fixed cost normally
resulting from straight line depreciation. During years of
heavy production, the replacement fund could overflow.
In lean years it might prove inadequate to the needs. Thus,
from a management accounting standpoint, the concept of a
replacement charge is not a good substitute for depreciation.
Prom a practical standpoint, however, the replacement cost
met the needs of the Ordnance Corps and served a worthy
purpose.
Ultimately, this source of income was cut off by
the regulations governing military industrial funds. As a
result, the Department of the Army initiated action to
obtain legislative authority for depreciation of plant
equipment and facilities. The first such proposal to amend
Section 405 of Public Law 216, was Initiated in 1952, for
inclusion in the Department of Defense Legislative Program
for 1953. Every year since then to the time of this writing
in 1958, the Army has made a similar proposal. Each year
It was defeated by objections from the Departments of the Air
Force and Navy.
By way of explanation, it should be noted that
legislative proposals from the military services are
(II
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submitted to the Department of Defense. Each proposal 1b
Identified bj a DOD number., and i3 then submitted to the
military departments for comment. If the military services
agree to the propo . and if the Department of Defense
concurs, they are submitted In the DOD Legislative Program
to the Congress. The initiating military department is
designated as the sponsoring agency, and is responsible
for the staff work involved in the presentation.
A review of the Array proposals: indicates that each
had technical defects. They lacked necessary provisions for
funding depreciation, as well as definitions as to the
scope of application, and the control and use of funded
reserves. It is probable that these omissions were
intentional, and that the objective was merely to obtain
Congressional authority to implement the depreciation
concept. Obviously the implementation v depend on
administrative a&reement amon^ the three services and the
Department of Defense,
In accordance with prescribed procedure, the Army
proposals were submitted to the Air Force and the Navy for
comment. Because of a general lack of understand aid
information on the subject of depreciation, no agreement
has ever been re matter. In the meanwhile,
more than six years have elapsed while the subject of
depreciation has been debated by memoranda between t
three services. In the absence of agreement among the
military departments, the Department of Defense found a basis




programs. While this would seem reasonable, it is none-the-less
curious inasmuch as the body of opinion in the DOD Comptroller
organization favors the concept of depreciation. It
appears that political considerations, unrelated to the
matter of depreciation, prevented the Department of Defense
from resolving the service disagreement which would have led
to the introduction of the Army proposals.
In the following material, the positions of the
Air Force and the Navy are summarized for each of the years
in which the Array initiated a depreciation proposal. The
Navy position is examined in more detail, by indicating the
position of the various Bureaus and Offices concerned. The
disagreement among these Bureaus and Offices resulted in a
Navy determination to oppose the Army proposal. As will
be noted, the determinations were not based on majority
opinion, nor on the weight of opinion from those Bureaus
involved in the management of industrial activities. The
mere lack of unanimity defeated the proposals.
As a matter of record, the Army proposal was
identified in the DOD Legislative Programs for 1953 as
item DOD 83-210 entitled Proposed Legislation "To amend
Section 405 of the National Security Act of 1947* as amended,
to authorize depreciation of facilities or equipment in
connection with working-capital funds."
The Air Force Position
From the outset, the Air Force has opposed the
authorization of depreciation on industrial facilities. A
memorandum dated March 2, 1953* from the Office of the
<ll
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Secretary of the Air Force stated objections to the
"revolutionary change in government financial policy," that
would be occasioned by the application of depreciation.
The memorandum noted further that it had always been policy
to replace capital assets only by appropriations. In
addition, exception was taken to the proposal because it
would apply only to Industrial Fund Activities, and not to
Industrial Activities funded by appropriations. Other
objections included:
a. Inevitable cost comparisons with private industry;
b. Confusion likely to be created in the accounting
systems;
c. The inexperience of military personnel (including
civilian employees) in handling depreciation
matters;
d. The impeding of the establishment of industrial
funds in other activities.
None of the foregoing could be considered valid
reasons. Mere difficulty and inexperience has never been
sufficient reason to retard the development of financial
management concepts.
Later, in 1953* with reference to the DOD Legislative
Program for 195^ the Air Force reiterated the position taken
by the March 2 memorandum. In 195^* however, the Air Force
reversed this position, and stated that there were no
objections to the Army proposal for the 1955 Legislative
Program. Certain minor changes to the proposal were
recommended however. This was the only time that the Air
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Force ever modified its position on the depreciation question.
By some coincidence, the Navy nearly reached agreement on
the matter too, as will be noted later.
By the time the Legislative Program for 1956 came
up for review, the Air Force returned to its earlier
opposition of the Army proposal. In a memorandum dated
5 December 1955.* the Air Force noted that the proposed
legislation would, (1) require an increase in annual
appropriations, and (2) require the building of sizeable
working capital reserves to purchase capital items for
replacement purposes. In this way, it \sfas noted, the
proposal would require budgeting indirectly for the cost of
capital items in annual appropriations. In addition, the
Air Force objected to the unnecessary accounting workload
that depreciation would develop. Concern was also expressed
for the threat to depreciation reserves by review authorities
when funds were needed elsewhere.
On the whole, the Air Force position as expressed
above was more reasonable and on sounder ground than the
1953 expression. Nevertheless, certain basic misconceptions
are in evidence, the chief one being that a sizeable working
capital reserve would be built up by depreciation reserves.
Annual programming of replacements would be a simple and
necessary expedient to the proper use of such reserves.
The Air Force reiterated its opposition to the Army
proposal in the 1957 Legislative Program in substantially the
same form as noted previously. By memorandum dated 16




proposal in the 1958 Legislative Program. The reasons noted
Include t
1. Vulnerability of reserves to action by review
authority;
2. Congressional desires to review capital require-
ments prior to authorization of funding;
3. The general workload involved;
4. Administrative expense;
5. The creation of new problems of a programming
and management nature.
In reviewing the expressions of the Air Force on
the matter of depreciation, the impression is gained that
the problems of operating industrial activities are not well
understood. Of course the Air Force does not have any
sizeable investment or experience in the industrial
activity area. With great perspicacity, the Air Force has
employed private enterprise to carry out most of its
industrial repair work and activity. At the same time,
the Air Force has enjoyed full Congressional support of its
appropriation requests in the development of such industrial
activities as it does operate. Its inventory in machine
tools and equipment is modern. It does not face the same
degree of obsolescence which plagues the Arm?/ and Navy
industrial plants. The application of the Industrial Fund
concept to Air Force installations is minimized, and
involves for the most part only support activities such as
minor shop repair work for aircraft, laundry and printing
operations. Thus, it can be concluded that depreciation is
*
38
not a real problem for the Air Force, although In time it may
be.
The Navy Position
The Department of the Navy has also consistently
opposed the Army efforts to introduce depreciation proposals
into the Department of Defense Legislative Programs. Each
year, from 1953 to 195$* the official paper to the Department
of Defense indicated that the Navy shared the Air Force
opinions on the matter. However, behind the official Navy
decision there was disagreement among the Bureaus and Offices
on the subject.
In accordance with established procedure, the Army
proposal was submitted for comment to interested Navy
activities. These activities included the Marine Corps, the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Office of General
Counsel, the Office of the Navy Comptroller, the Office of
Naval Material, and all the Bureaus except Personnel. The
following indicates the reaction of each to the proposals:
The Headquarters, Marine Corps had no comment or no
objection until 1955. Since then it has opposed the proposals
The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations deferred
to the Navy Comptroller's opinion in most instances. In 195^
however the Chief of Naval Operations opposed the measure,
while in 1958, OPNAV concurred with it.
The Office of General Counsel deferred to the Navy
Comptroller's opinion until 1958* at which time the General
Counsel opposed the proposal.
The Navy Comptroller's opinion as expressed by the
«l!
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Deputy opposed the proposal in 1953 and 195^. For the 1955
Legislative Program, the Deputy Comptroller supported the
proposal. Subsequently, in the absence of agreement within
the Department, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial
Management) rejected the proposal for the Navy. Since then,
the Deputy Comptroller has opposed it.
Consistent opposition to the depreciation proposal
has come each year from the Chief of Naval Material, the
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and the Bureau of Yards and
Docks. BuSandA has been most vigorous in the style and
volume of opposing comment, and has substantially influenced
other opponents.
The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery has offered no
objection to the proposal. Likewise, with the exception of
1953* the Bureau of Aeronautics has had no objection.
The Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Ordnance have
consistently supported all of the Array proposals on
depreciation.
In the face of divided opinion in the Navy camp, the
position of the Department was necessarily placed in
opposition to the Army proposal. In at least two instances,
the problem was submitted to the Secretary of the Navy for
resolution. In each of these instances, the Assistant
Secretary of Navy (Financial Management) made the deter-
mination to oppose the depreciation plan. In 1956, in an
effort to resolve the disagreement, the Judge Advocate General
sponsored a conference of representatives from interested
Bureaus and Offices. The conference was fruitless.
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Navy opposition to the depreciation proposal has had
many facets or expression. They are summarized as follows:
a. Depreciation is meaningless because the elements
of profit, insurance, interest, and taxes are not present
in the military picture.
b. Congressional control of expenditures would be
lost, and control by the Bureau of the Budget or Department
of Defense would be substituted.
c. Depreciation reserves, once created, might be
used or taken for other purposes.
d. Depreciation v/ill not increase economy or
efficiency, but will require accounting for accounting's 3ake
e. Depreciation costs would be of questionable




Depreciation charges would use up customer
appropriations for operations.
g. Depreciation reserves would be purposeless
unless they could be freely used.
h. Excess overhead would be generated because of
depreciation of idle plant capacity,
i. Depreciation is not an appropriate charge in
military activities.
J. The proposed legislation did not provide for the
expenditure of depreciation reserves.
Within the foregoing framework of expression, it can
be deduced that the opposition was attributable toi
(1) A lack of understanding of the depreciation
(I
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problem as well as the over-all aspects of financial management;
(2) The fear and resistance normally encountered by
a new idea;
(3) Inadequate wording and definition in the Army
proposals which fostered misconception;
(4) Legitimate concern about the impact that
depreciation would have on operating funds and budgets in
its initial application.
The Navy proponents of the Army depreciation
proposals have stressed the need for a means of equipment
replacement, and the improved accounting of costs. The
supporting comment revolved around the following thoughts:
a. Depreciation is a means of plant replacement,
and a means for better accounting of costs.
b. Budgets reflecting depreciation costs would
more realistically cover the cost of work.
BuOrd and Buships were well aware, however , of the
problems involved in a depreciation program. Note was taken
of the defects in the Army proposal, and concern was
expressed as to the effects of idle plant capacity. Both
Bureaus indicated the need for definitions, and limitation
in the application of depreciation. Nevertheless, the
problem of obsolescence, and the lack of appropriation
support for plant equipment forced these two Bureaus into
support of the depreciation concept. As the management
agencies for the industrial complex represented by the Naval
Shipyards and the Naval Ordnance Plants, Buships and BuOrd
were keenly aware of their responsibilities. In addition,
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they are the only Bureaus with experience in Industrial
Fund operations, by which to evaluate the Array proposal. But
the principle of primary interest has not prevailed in the
determination of Navy's position. Thus, while there has
been a significant degree of support for the depreciation
proposal in the Navy, even a majority from time to time, the
Department of the Navy has officially opposed the proposal
because full agreement could not be reached.
Following the replies of disagreement on the
depreciation proposal from the Air Force and Navy, the
Department of the Army submitted strong rebuttals of the
objections to the Department of Defense. Army repeatedly
requested that DOD take action to resolve the disagreements.
However, the records do not indicate that any such action
was ever taken by the Department of Defense. In 195^, the
year in which the Air Force concurred with the proposal, and
the Navy was close to agreement, the Department of Defense
advised the Military Departments that no further action
was to be taken on the depreciation proposal pending
evaluation of the Cooper Committee Report. 3 This report,
which is dealt with in more detail in another part of this
study, fully endorsed the depreciation concept in industrial
activities. In spite of this, DOD took no action to implement
the depreciation proposals of the Army, or of the Cooper
3The Cooper Committee was officially established as
the Advisory Committee on Fiscal Organization and Procedures
by the Secretary of Defense in August 1953* for a thorough







Research Indicates that the Military Departments are
not generally aware of the DOD position on the matter of
depreciation. Apparently the matter has never been presented
in any official Department of Defense paper. The depreciation
problem is covered, however, in a manuscript draft entitled
"Financial Management in the Department of Defense" dated
November 1964. This document constitutes essentially a
financial management plan for the Department. It includes
the results of the Cooper Committee investigation, as well
as others. While it is obviously a document developed by
staff work, the primary authorship is attributed to the
Assistant Secretary cf Defense (Comptroller), Mr. W. B.
McNeil. Depreciation of machinery and equipment is fully
endorsed in this Defense document in relation to industrial
funds. Thus the problem within the Pentagon, on this
matter as well as others, is primarily one of communications,
rather than fundamental differences in principle.
To this point, the study indicates that the depreciation
concept is supported by the Congress, the Comptroller General,
the Bureau of the Budget, and the DOD Comptroller organization.
In addition, the management commands of the major military
industrial activities favor depreciation funding. With this
formidable support, the adoption of depreciation funding in
military industrial activities is long overdue. Oddly
enough, the legislative effort to cost and fund depreciation
in military industrial funds was prepared by the staff of the
(
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Small Business Committee of the Senate. Prior to this, the
Office of Defense Mobilization conducted an exhaustive study
of the machine tool and equipment problems involved in
mobilization planning. These problems included Government
ownership and utilization, related contractual arrangements
with private industry, depreciation, obsolescence, and
replacement. This study provided useful data for the bill
discussed in the following chapter, but ODM was not the
source of the proposed legislation.
4
Based on interviews with Mr. W. B. Stults of the
Committee, and Mr. Howard Smith, Production Division of the




Having failed to take definitive action on the
depreciation question over a period of seven years, the
Department of Defense was in 1957 confronted by action on
the matter in the Congress. In the first session of the 85th
Congress, Senator Sparkrnan of Alabama, introduced for himself
and Senator Thye of Minnesota a bill "to authorize the
employment of working capital funds in the procurement and
replacement of durable productive equipments The Bill,
S. 2595 was introduced in the Senate July 19, 1957 and
referred to the Committee on Armed Services. The bill
provides
that working capital funds established pursuant to
section 405 of Title IV of the National Security Act
of 1947* as amended (63 Stat 587), may be charged with
the cost of machine tools and other durable productive
equipment, and may be reimbursed with:
(i) rentals received from private contractors for the
use of Government owned machine tools and other
durable productive equipment;
(ii) price concessions or similar credits or allowances
received by the Government from private
contractors in lieu of rentals for the
use of Government -owned machine tools or other
durable productive equipment; and
(iii) charges or allowances for depreciation and
obsolescence on Government-owned machine tools
or other durable productive equipment in
arsenals, depots, factories, and similar
installations.
Disregarding the first two objectives of the bill,




for the industrial funds to be "reimbursed" by "charges or
allowances for depreciation." The proposed bill has some
obvious technical faults. First, it does not provide for
the initial capitalization of subject equipment into the
industrial fund involved. Secondly, while it authorizes
charges to the industrial fund for the costs of subject
equipment (presumed to be the purchase thereof), no provision
is made for the specific accumulation (funding) of reserves
for depreciation under the funds. Third, the bill does not
prescribe how expenditures of the depreciation reserves
(if established) would be handled or controlled. Fourth,
the bill is permissive, and from this standpoint, it does
not integrate with other legislation prescribing budgetary
and accounting requirements. Nevertheless, in spite of the
foregoing defects, the intent of the bill is good and
Justifiable with respect to its depreciation aspects. Un-
fortunately, the other objectives of the bill which are
highly controversial and highly complex, will likely confuse
the depreciation issue.
In the second session of the 85th Congress, Repre-
sentative Reuss of Wisconsin introduced an identical
companion bill, identified as H.R. IOG30, as of February 19,
1958. A week later, Senator Flanders of Vermont, introduced
a proposed amendment to S. 2595 which provides for additional
reimbursement of tne industrial fund from "returns from the
sale of used productive equipment in arsenals, factories,
and similar Installations."
It now appears that some definite congressional
<
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consideration and possible action will be taken on the
question of depreciation. Unfortunately, the legislation
proposed was authored and initiated from outside the Defense
Department. This is considered unfortunate because of the
wealth of background available in the Pentagon which could
have contributed to the formulation of the proposal. There
is one advantage, however, and that is that hearings on the
bill will elicit an official stand on the matter of
depreciation from the Department of Defense.
As of this writing the Department of Defense is
endeavoring to establish a position on the Sparkman Bill. A
review of the working papers involved indicates that the
depreciation provisions of the bill will be favorably
endorsed. One portion of a working paper expresses it this
way:
Such depreciation charges . . . would provide funds
to the managers of industrial fund activities, subject
to higher level budgetary review and approval, for the
purpose of modernization and replacement of such [plant]
equipment, with reduced production costs.
1
If this position is ever officially represented
in the Congress, it should go a long way toward eliminating
inter-service disagreement on the matter of depreciation.
After the official DOD position on the Sparkman
Bill has been established, it will be submitted to the
Military Departments for comment. In order to have infor-
mation on which to base comments, the Navy Office of
-J-From an unpublished, official position paper
prepared in the Office of the Comptroller, Department of
Defense, as of March 1958.

4G
Legislative Liai3ion has already submitted the Sparkman Bill
to the Bureaus and Offices for comment. While these comments
have yet to be evaluated into a formal position, the
following provides a resume of the thinking
.
Navy Viewpoints on the Sparkman Bill, S. 2595
NavComp opposed the bill for reasons based entirely
on the depreciation provisions. The other aspects of the
bill were ignored. By letter to the Chief of Legislative
Liaison, dated 13 August 1957* the Deputy Comptroller stated
"This office does not support depreciation as a device for
the measurement of the current consumption of capital items."
In reference to the confusing language of the bill, the
letter states further "although the charge for depreciation
is shown as a reimbursement to the working capital fund
rather than a charge . . . , depreciation and obsolescence
are not receipts but are in the nature of costs," One gains
a persistent impression that the Office of the Comptroller
has some very basic misconceptions about depreciation.
BuAero opposed enactment of the bill, expressing the
old fear that it would be the death knell for future
appropriations for machine tool purchases. There was no
recognition of the fact that an adequate depreciation program,
properly administered, would eliminate the need for such
appropriations. Concern was also noted for the strain on
supply appropriations.
As usual, BuSandA strongly opposed the Sparkman Bill,
just as it has consistently opposed all other depreciation
proposals. As the leader of the opposition to depreciation
•
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proposals, BuSandA views were echoed by the Marine Corps,
the Office of General Counsel, ONM and BuDocks.
The Bureau of Ordnance, which had supported Array
depreciation proposals previously, withheld support of this
bill in its present form.
Alone among the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy, the
Bureau of Ships supported S. 2595. In a concise letter,
BuShips simply noted that the bill would bring the budget
structure more in line with the performance budget concept
by including depreciation as a charge to work programs. It
was also noted that the bill would permit a more orderly
balanced machine tool replacement program. Apparently, the
impact of rentals on contractors for use of Government
owned equipment did not enter the Bureau's considerations.
The paramount concern of the Bureau of Ships is the obsolescence
of its industrial plant, and the ineffectiveness of the
appropriation method of replacement
.
In an effort to understand the Bureau of Ships
support for the depreciation concept, the following chapter
is devoted to an analysis of its positions.
«•
CHAPTER VI
THE BUREAU OF SHIPS POSITION
Within the Department of the Navy, the Eureau of
Ships has been the most ardent and consistent supporter
of proposed depreciation legislation. Since 1953* when the
first formalized effort was made to introduce such a proposal
in the Department of Defense Legislative Program, the Bureau
of Ships has favorably endorsed every proposal to include the
depreciation concept in the funding of its industrial
activities. While other Navy activities have also supported
the depreciation concept, the Bureau of Ships, with its vast
industrial plant, has the primary Navy interest at stake in
this problem.
An examination of the Bureau of Ships' position is
necessary in order to understand the problem, and to get it
into a practical light devoid of accounting theory, military
philosophy or politics. The Bureau of Ships position will
be indicative of other Navy Bureaus operating under the
Industrial Fund, as well as other military agencies with
large industrial installations.
What is the Bureau of Ships 1 interest in this matter
of depreciation? It is simply this: as the management
bureau for an investment of more than $300,000,000 in
machine tools and plant equipment the Bureau is witnessing




as well as the slower but more inexorable deterioration due
to wear and tear in the usage of its equipment. The Bureau's
responsibility for maintaining its organization at maximum
effectiveness and efficiency is emphasized not only in such
fundamental authority as the U.S. Navy Regulations, but in
every survey and report made on its activities. At the
same time the Bureau's efforts to plan and program for the
orderly replacement of its plant equipment have suffered in
the process of budgetary review of appropriation requests.
There is little appeal to the unglamorous needs of machine
tool replacement in comparison to guided miG3iles, nuclear
developments, and strategic sea and air power. It is too
easy to delete budgetary requests, however modest, for the
military industrial plant, in an effort to comply with
arbitrary budget cuts or objectives.
In 1956 BuShips initiated a new program to replace
over-age and obsolete machine tools at Naval Shipyards and
Repair Facilities. This new "Machine Tool Replacement
Program," the result of an extensive study of the needs, was
introduced in the fiscal year 1957 budget. The program
consisted of the following phases:
Phase I, Replacement of Machine Shop Tools (Shop 31) 1
Phase II, Replacement of Machine Tools in other Shops
Phase III, Replacement of Woodworking Machines
Phase IV, Replacement of Metal Working Machines.
The initial budgetary submission, under the Ships and
The Inside Machine Shop in Naval Shipyards.
•
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Facilities, Navy appropriation included $14,367,000 for the
first portion of Phase I. The phase was to be completed in
five years at a total estimated cost of $71,846,000. Phase II
was to begin in fiscal year 1958, with the start on the other
phases to be made in each succeeding year. The program was
based on a complete and detailed study of the requirements
of each activity, as well as the best information on machine
tool technology available from the industry.
The experience of the Bureau of Ships Machine Tool
Replacement Program in the budgetary processes is illustrated
by the table on the following page, a chronological summary
of events and action.
Following the failure to obtain even a budgetary
submission of its needs to the Congress for F.Y. 1957, the
Bureau of Ships requested and obtained a release of $3,500,000
from the Bureau of the Budget reserve under the current
1956 ships and facilities Navy appropriation.
This amount had been budgeted and appropriated for
machine tools and equipment, yet the Bureau of the Budget
had frozen the funds by establishing a reserve on the
appropriation. The funds were not released until late in
June of 1956, June 30 being the expiration date for obligation
of the funds. It would appear that by the release of the funds
so late in the fiscal year, the Bureau of the Budget enter-
tained some hope that it would be impossible to obligate the
money within the statutory time limit. By means of a crash
program, which actually was based on skillful pre-planning,




Action F.Y. 1957 F.Y. 1958 F.Y. 1959
Budget Request

















Allowed +3, 720, 000 7,000,000 +1,000,000
Reclama none none
Submission to
OSD (Comp.) 7,220,000 3, 200, 000a 4, 800, 000
OSD Action:













Action none 3, 200, 000 c
Program for
the Year none 3, 200, 000 c
aA further cut of $3,800,000 was made by Nav. Comp.
because of expenditure ceiling imposition.





example is used as an illustration of an all too frequent
situation which occurs and is characteristic of the "money
Game" in Washington.
As noted in the summary, $3,200,000 was obtained in
the F.Y. 1958 budget by congressional appropriation versus
an original requirement of $16 million. This small amount
could hardly cover more than the most urgent replacements,
while the benefits of orderly programming are completely
negated by the dribble process of procurement.
The $4.8 million estimate included in the F.Y. 1959
President's Budget represents 2$ of the $246 million
acquisition value of active machine tools at Bureau of Ships
activities. It does not represent the Bureau's requirements.
This value is the minimum replacement action required (and
permitted) in accordance with Department of Defense Directive
4215.7 of 21 September 1956. Note should be taken of the
fact that current replacement costs exceed original
acquisition costs by a factor of two to one. Thus the
actual replacement funding is, in effect, enough to cover
only 1$ of the tools.
The D0D Directive 4215.2 previously noted allows
for an annual request for machine tool replacement funds in
the order of 2# to 5$ of original acquisition cost. It
further stipulated that such funds are to be utilized only
for the replacement of machine tools currently in use., and
not for the replacement of tools in departmental reserves or
inactive plants. It would appear that this directive pro-
vides for the complete replacement of the active machine
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tool inventory in 20 to 50 years at stable price levels.
This is hardly an acceptable or realistic precept from any
point of view, business, technological, or military. With
funds so limited, the Bureau's machine tool replacement
program, formulated prior to issuance of the DOD Directive,
would appear to be voided. This is unfortunate in that the
2# to 5% replacement effort, when funded, is not enough to
offset obsolescences actually taking place. It will permit
only replacement of the most critically outmoded tools with
a subsequent reduction in potential savings attendant to
manpower, floor space and operating costs. Failure to replace
over-age and worn-out machine tools will result in signi-
ficantly greater operational and maintenance costs. In
addition, the absence of a replacement program will create a
void in technological proficiency, in training of personnel,
in mobilization readiness, and in the efficiency and morale
of both plant personnel and management. Costs to the
consumers, such as ships of the fleet will rise, just as effec-
tively in terms of reduced efficiency, as they would in
terms of depreciation charges, if such were allowed. BuShips
estimates indicate that an annual expenditure of $14 million
would be required to keep machine tools in its industrial
activities sufficiently up to date to realize recognized
tooling standards for efficiency in operations.
It is obvious from the foregoing summary that no
orderly program of plant equipment replacement could be
carried out by the Bureau of Ships or any management Bureau
via the appropriation route. Equally obvious is the fact
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that plant equipment obsolescence and replacement Is either
not understood or is ignored by the military and administrative
authority above the Bureau level. It should be noted here
that the budget review by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense is held jointly with the Bureau of the Budget, so
that the authorship of action at this level cannot always
be identified externally. If we accept as valid the
Bureau's budgetary submissions for fiscal years 1957 and
1958, (and they are certainly not unreasonable based on the
inventory), the 10$ return on budgetary submissions over the
two year period could hardly be considered helpful. In
actuality, to receive 10# of a planned program creates a
substantial adminiD. voive problem in itself.
Is it any wonder, then, that the Bureau of Ships
supports a funded depreciation program which offers a
reasonable chance of orderly replacement of plant equipment;'
There are other aspects of the machine tool problem
which support the Bureau's position. One of them is the
following summary which provides a comparison of the age
of machine tools within the Department of Defense:
Age Army Air Force OverallNavy BuShips
under 5 years old 620 57g 39.5$ U0
Under 10 years old 66$ 60$ 49.0$ 130
Under 15 years old 95$ 98# 83.50 66$
Over 15 years old 5-- 20 16. 3W
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The Bureau of Ships position is all too clear from
this summary. With 857' of all machine tools over ten years
old, 34$ over fifteen years old, the Bureau finds its
activities burdened with pre -World War II design and tech-
nology. These tools, bought largely during World War II,
lack the significant changes in design, speed, power and
efficiency brought about by post-war research and development.
In addition, their normal useful life has been shortened by
accelerated use through World War II and the Korean War.
In the reclama following the cut made in the preliminary
DOD review of the F.Y. 1959 budget, the Bureau of Ships pre-
sented the following information:
The replacement of machine tools is essential as the
items to be replaced are worn out and costs of their
continued operation are exhorbitant. If not replaced,
excess costs will continue to be reflected in maintenance,
new construction, and conversion. The savings which
can be made are estimated at over $1.2 million annually,
which will return the $4.8 million investment in 46
months. Expressed in man hours, the present expenditure
of about 506, 240 man hours can be reduced to 3*^960
man hours a year by the proposed replacement ....
The savings to be accomplished depend on usage.
At greater than current workload, the savings will be
that much greater, and the procurements will pay for
themselves in a proportionally shorter time . . . . 2
This is the answer to questions as to how money can
be saved by the use of depreciation as a funded cost. In-
dustry learned long ago that lower costs, and hence bigger
profits, are to be gained by taking advantage of new technical
developments, and not in the exhaustion of obsolescing tools.
The entire field of productive enterprise and automation is




based on this understanding. If government operations are
to achieve the efficiency of business-like procedures, then
business methods will have to be used. Depreciation is
one of these.
Navy Industrial Fund Activities have maintained a
statistical cost for depreciation as a matter of record since
the inception of the Industrial Fund.
The naval shipyards had always maintained plant
account records in accordance with Navy requirements. Thus
it was a relatively simple Job to convert to the property
accounting system required by the regulations issued by the
Department of Defense. Depreciation for the plant equipment
involved is based on the acquisition cost, using the straight
line method. The table on the following page shov/s the
value of plant equipment and the value of depreciation
as of the end of fiscal years 1956 and 1957.
Several points of interest may be noted from this
table. The first is that the current annual rate for
depreciation is about $6 million. The burden of this cost
could be absorbed easily and without noticeable effect by
the multiple appropriations which support the consumers of
shipyard goods and services. The second point of interest
is that the totals of depreciation indicate that as of 30 June
1957 j the capital investment has been depreciated 64$. This,
of course, is a reflection of the earlier figures showing
the age categories of equipment in percentages of the total.
^Developed from unpublished financial data and reports
available in the Bureau of Ships.
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A third point of interest is the change in value of equipment
by activity from 1956 to 1957. Some show no change; others
show very minor increases; and two show decreases. The
decreases are encouraging because they indicate that some










Portsmouth $21.6 $21.6 $13.5 $13.8 + .3
Boston 28.1 28.9 17.4 18.3 .9
New York 65.4 65.6 43.7 44.7 1.0
Philadelphia 48.1 48.5 33.2 34.8 1.6
Norfolk 48.7 48.9 30.0 30.9 .9
Charleston 18.6 19.1 11.9 12.3 .4
Long Beach 21. 21.8 10.7 11.9 1.
San Francisco 22.
2
24.0 9.- 10.1 .9
Mare Island 41.7 42.4 28.1 29.0 .9
Puget Sound 31.6 31.6 19.3 20.1 Q• O
Pearl Harbor 32.7 30.9 21.7 20.4 -1.3
NAVREPFAC SDIEGO 8.7 7.5 6.2 4.3 -1.9
Totals 389.2 390.8 244.9 250.6 5.7
Considering the statistical data shown, it is evident
that the small annual accrual of depreciation changes would
be inadequate to finance the tremendous replacement program
I
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indicated by (l) the age of equipment, (2) the extent of
technological obsolescence, and (3) the rising cost of new
equipment. It must be concluded therefore that the depreciation
program in effect for statistical purposes is inadequate.
If the statistical costs were to be funded under the present
program, the managing agencies would still require
appropriations to supplement their depreciation reserves in
the replacement of equipment. Such a situation is likely to
create friction within the Congress as well as frustration,
dissatisfaction and confusion in the budgetary process. It
would seem most desirable, therefore, to design a new program
of depreciation that would meet the needs of Industrial Fund
activities. Such a program should be eared to recent
developments in production control procedures which include
improved job costing, cost standards, production scheduling
and other aspects of manufacturing cost accounting.

CHAPTER VII
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A DEPRECIATION PROGRAM
Within a military industrial fund activity the
objectives of a depreciation program should be to:
1. Reflect accurately the cost of depreciation with
respect to operations and specific jobs.
2. Establish a system and rate which is equitable
for the customer.
3. Provide, insofar as practicable, for the main-
tenance of capital investment, productive capacity, and
industrial potential required to meet military needs and
technological requirements.
Subsidiary objectives should include minimal costs to
customer allotments, as well as the avoidance of excessive
reserves which would invite confiscation and criticism.
To achieve the first objective, viz., accurate
costing, depreciation rates may be predicated on individual
machine rates, or on a shop or cost center basis. The use
of machine rates might introduce certain accounting compli-
cations in cases of multiple machine employment in processing
any given job through one or more shops. Machine rates are
used successfully in industry, however. In a Naval shipyard
shop, two methods of machine rate application seem feasible.
The first would be by maintaining a running log on each




spent. These logs could be collected daily or weekly as
desired and processed by available EDP systems. Another
feasible method under new shop planning procedures would be
to have machine usage identified on the job instruction cards
either by the shop planner or the machine operator. With the
adoption of either of these suggestions accurate data and
costing can be readily provided.
Application of a shop or cost center rate would
undoubtedly be easier, and would have greater validity in
certain process costing. In most cases, shop performance is
based on the integrated capacity and complementary char-
acteristics of machine tools or systems. It must be assumed
on this basis that all shop machines contribute to production
in some way. This however can be true only if the criteria
for active plant capacity are met. The obvious weakness to
a composite depreciation rate occurs in shops burdened with
under-absorbed machine tools or equipment. This situation
is not uncommon in Naval shipyards when an imbalance develops
in the shop workload. When shop imbalances develop, either
because of operational or budgetary factors, or because
workload scheduling has been remiss, particular shops and
machines are idle. The burden of their depreciation must
then be borne by current customers. This condition may be
alleviated by the machine rate concept.
To achieve the second objective, viz., equitable
application of depreciation costs, idle machine capacity
based on mobilization requirements should be charged to
either military support or industrial mobilization funds.
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They should not be included in current production costs,
resulting in a distortion of such figures. If and when such
tools are inactivated, cost treatment may be on a statistical
basis for depreciation purposes, as well as for such major
maintenance as may be indicated. This would provide manage-
ment with essential information as to future utilization of
idle tools. Minor maintenance, preservation, care and
security of idle plant capacity should also be removed from
industrial fund operation costs.
Perpetuation of the costs of idle plant capacity
should be avoided if possible . Idle plant capacity should be
subjected to special scrutiny and evaluation, based on the
probable needs of the military service, current and projected,
An annual review, at local and Washington levels, should
endeavor to determine the need for such equipment in relation
to: (l) activity missions, present and future, (2) broad
military decisions affecting the fleet and operating forces,
and (3) new industrial and technical progress.
Any consideration of the problem leads immediately
to the need for definition of terms, both for Navy management
and for specific presentations before Congress. The first
two broad categories that must be defined are: active plant
capacity and idle plant capacity.
Active plant capacity should include only tools which
meet the following criteria:
a. A current need.




c. A reasonable excess in capacity to provide for
work peaks, breakdown, routine maintenance, and
unusual requirements.
Idle plant capacity should include all tools for
which there is a bona fide mobilization requirement, but for
which, in relation to current productive operations:
a. There is no current need.
b. There is no actual annual repetitive usage data.
c. Functions can be performed by other active equipment.
d. Operational revenue does not match costs.
Application of one or more of these criteria should
be sufficient to make a determination as to category.
Common sense will be required, of course, but efforts should
be made to discount shop sentimentality in the retention of
tools.
In many Naval shipyard shops the determination of idle
plant capacity can be readily made because tools have been put
in preservation, moved out of production lines or otherwise
inactivated. Thus the first broad determination to establish
idle plant capacity could be easily made. In other cases,
information available from shop masters and supervisors will
indicate which equipment falls under the above criteria. This
information will be useful if it is not unduly warped by
vested shop interest. In any event, a survey by an
industrial engineering group should be made for final
evaluation.
The next major consideration is the method of
depreciation to be used. There are several types, such as
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the familiar straight line method, the reducing fractions
method, the hourly rate method, and others which may be
applied. The selection of the method would normally be
based on factors which affect business, but which are
not found in a military establishment. Since the objective
of the Naval shore establishment is to serve the fleet under
conditions of maximized efficiency and economy, an orderly,
effective program for replacement of plant equipment must
be a prime consideration of a depreciation plan. For this
purpose, the reducing fraction method is recommended.
This method is designed to normalize depreciation
costs and maintenance costs over the life of the asset so
that depreciation costs in the early life of equipment are
balanced by the heavier maintenance costs in the later stages
of use. The reducing fraction rate is established by taking
the sum of the digits from the first to last year for the
denominator, and using in reversed order the number of the
year as the numerator. In the case of a ten-year life machine,
the sum of the digits one to ten is fifty-five. The rate for
the first year would be 10/55, 9/55 for the second, and so on.
This method is recommended because: (1) it is less
susceptible to long range inflationary trends which vitiate
slow accumulations by straight line methods ; (2) it is
partic larly suitable to the determinative or limited
objective factors en which military organizations are
operated; (3) it is especially suitable to the general
capabilities of the Navy accounting system, and amenable under




There is one disadvantage of the reducing fraction
method. It may thrust a high initial depreciation rate into
the overhead, depending on the date chosen to impose the
depreciation factor as a cost. Therefore considerable
thought and planning will have to be devoted to programming,
so that the depreciation factor can be integrated with minimum
initial effect.
The determinant factors noted in (2) above would
appear to be of overriding importance in the case of military
installation. By this is meant that military programming
and planned objectives dictate life expectancy of operations.
For example,, the planned phasing out of weapons such as a
B-52 aircraft or a class of minesweeper would indicate that
specialized equipment to service such weapons should be
depreciated out in a similar time span. The longer life
spans of sea borne weapons should permit very reasonable
life estimates to be established by Naval industrial activities.
The life determinations established by equipment manufacturers
may not furnish adequate reserves for replacement of equipment
because of the acceleration of technological obsolescence.
Another major determination to be made is just what
equipment will be depreciated within the active plant
definition. The Bureau of Ships has already suggested that
depreciation be limited to acquisitions as of a certain date.
From an accounting standpoint this suggestion has considerable
merit as it would (l) reduce original workload and accelerate
installation of a system; (2) reduce the impact of
CI
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depreciation on appropriations for the consuming or operating
forces; (3) facilitate decisions necessary in determinations
of active and idle plant facilities; (4) provide a firm basis
on which to project management studies leading to capital
budgeting.
Actually, such a decision should be reached and
included in any legislation which authorizes or directs
the use of depreciation in military organizations. The
military establishment is burdened with obsolete equipment,
the useful life of which has long been exceeded. It would
be far better to begin the application of depreciation with a
clean slate as of some arbitrary date such as 1950 than to
research ancient records which have neither meaning nor value
in the areas of price or technology today.
Using 1950 as the acquisition date, with a fixed
depreciation method, statistical data can be projected
ahead as to the depreciation charges for the proposed year
of application. The fiscal year i960 is suggested as the
one year in which to start depreciation accruals. This
date would permit time for estimates of depreciation charges
to be incorporated in appropriation requests for the operating
forces.
This proposal would also permit the development of a
capital budget for Industrial Fund activities by i960 for
subsequent years. Such a budget may initially require
appropriated funds to supplement the depreciation reserves
which will be small in the first years of operation. It is
anticipated, however, that within five years a capital budget
can be sustained on depreciation reserves alone.
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Depreciation reserves for the support of a capital
budget for equipment should be under the control of the
management Bureau. Preparation of a capital budget should
likewise be under Bureau control and sponsorship. It
would be built on submissions from field commands operating
under industrial funds. It v/ould be submitted through the
usual channels for inclusion in the President's budget. It
would be subject to the same review, justification, and
approval as other budgetary submissions.
It should differ, however, in one important respect.
After approval by the Congress of the capital budget for
industrial fund activities, it should be subject to no
further control by means of reservations or other fund
restrictions by budget review authorities. This suggestion
is made because the machinery and equipment expenditures of
a capital budget v/ould be based on the depreciation reserves.
Of course, if the unlikely situation developed where the
capital structure of an industrial fund were to become
bloated by unused depreciation reserves, review by the Depart-
ment of Defense or the Congress would undoubtedly result in
partial recission of the fund. This hazard indicates the
need of alert management to exploit fully the use of
depreciation reserves subject to budgetary review and approval.
Restrictive budgetary controls on the depreciation
reserves would, however, stifle or kill the managerial
initiative essential to successful business-like operation
of industrial activities. Indeed, there is considerable
evidence that such has already been the case, in instances
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too numerous to quote. 1 Management control, so urgently
sought in legislation and In studies by commissions and
committees, can only be achieved by exercising the experience
and professional competence of those charged with managerial
responsibilities. It cannot be achieved by substituting
the judgment of a budget analyst for that of an operating
executive or administrator.
A Capital Budget
To achieve the third objective of a depreciation
program, viz., maintaining military industrial capacity in
relation to military needs, budgetary development is essential
It would appear that a capital budget for industrial
fund activities is the proper vehicle by which to project
expenditures of depreciation reserves. It would serve,
additionally, as the financial plan for civil works projects,
building and land acquisitions, and similar capital programs
and expenditures. For this type of expenditure Congressional
authorization and appropriations would be required. Such a
budget would require and obtain the desired management
planning and control. It would allay Congressional concern
as to its control of the purse, at the same time providing
for administrative review through executive levels.
The capital budget should also be the planning
vehicle for the future, containing forecasts of requirements
for five to ten years. Such a master plan or budget would,
Based on personal observation and substantiated by
Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955), Chapter XI.
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of course, be executed in yearly increments—the annual capital
budget. The fears that depreciation reserves would be
diverted or administratively consumed by the Bureau of the
Budget can be substantially negated by alert utilization of
the annual depreciation accruals, and by firm planning for
the future. As simple as this sounds, it will nevertheless
present a real challenge to management at local and bureau
levels.
As regards Congressional control of the purse, a
matter unduly burdened with the concern of many not on
Capitol Hill, a capital budget would offer many advantages.
Initiation of such a plan by military agencies would
undoubtedly receive a warm welcome. The basis for a capital
budget already exists in the Shore Station Development Plan
of the Navy and similar plans in the other services. It
needs only to be formalized into a budgetary program.
There are a number of Government activities operating
under revolving funds which use the depreciation principle
most successfully. One of these is the Bureau of Engraving
and Printing, which is treated in the next chapter as an
example of industrial funding under full exploitation.
<
CHAPTER VIII
A DEPRECIATION PROGRAM IN ACTION
In the application of the revolving fund principle
to Government enterprise, Public Law 656, 8lst Congress, 2nd
Session, stands out as probably the finest piece of legislation
1
ever enacted by the Congress for such a purpose. This Act,
which placed the Bureau of Engraving and Printing on a
revolving fund as of July 1, 1951* is so thorough, detailed
and business-like that it is a basic charter for operations,
without the need of further executive definition, or
regulation. Minor administrative interpretations, necessary
for the detailed accounting procedures and control, have been
subsequently established by the Bureau and approved by the
Comptroller General. Credit for the language of the Act goes
2to the Joint Accounting Program Committee, which was ably
assisted by Bureau personnel as to the requirements for
plant operation.
The depreciation features of the Act are most
important in the financial control, and the operations of the
Bureau. With the exception of building, land, and building
The bulk of information in this chapter was obtained
by interview with Mr. C. E. Deery, Controller of the Bureau
of Engraving and Printing, and from documents which he provided,
p
Representatives of the Bureau of the Budget, the
General Accounting Office, and the Treasury Department.
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appurtenances, 3 ail assets of the Bureau were capitalized
at the time of establishment of the revolving fund. In
connection with the capitalization of plant equipment and
machinery, office machines and furniture and fixtures, a
valuation metnod was established based on the replacement
cost principle to determine present value as of July 1, 1951.
The replacement cost principle involved the deter-
mination of;
a. Current market values—the price established by
a willing buyer and a willing seller.
b. Replacement costs as determined by the manu-
facturing industry for similar items.
c. A present value determination based on acquisition
cost, esculated by application of labor and material cost
indices.
This rather detailed determination of present value
was necessitated by Congressional rejection of the depreciated
cost of acquisition originally offered for capitalization of
the fund. Because of the specialized nature of some equipment,
item (c) above was required where (a) and (b) were not
obtainable
.
The straight line method of depreciation was
established for all capitalized equipment. Asset life was
determined using data and standards established in comparable
business and industrial activities, and accepted by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue. The property accounting records were
3such as elevators, over head crosses, inter-
communication systems, plumbing, etc.
«'
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revised and set up to record the necessary depreciation
charges, future capitalized repairs, overhauls or modifications,
as well as cost data for maintenance charged to current
expense. The Bureau operates largely on a process cost
system, although individual job costing is used as appropriate.
Cost centers are established, each of which reflects appli-
cable depreciation in its overhead rate. For minor inter-
changeable equipment such as inkpots, numbering cylinders
and similar items, a composite depreciation rate is used.
Furniture and equipment is also subject to a composite
depreciation rate. The composite rate simplifies the
handling of such charges, at the same time maintaining
equitable distribution of depreciation charges between cost
centers.
The important feature of the depreciation program
is that the reserves accumulated are under the complete
management control of the Bureau. They may be used as
necessary either for the replacement of plant equipment,
material inventories, or working capital, thereby permitting
management to exercise the flexibility which a revolving
fund is supposed to provide.
The Bureau now carries out an orderly replacement
program of production equipment which has yielded significant
increases in economy and efficiency of operations. To cite
examples, five new machines replaced 39 obsolete pieces of
equipment in one postage stamp production process; in
currency printing, new machines with a 300$ increase in
capacity produced a 20$ savings in process costing. The
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corollary savings in manpower, maintenance costs, floor
space, cost accounting, reduced spoilage, as well as relief
from the labor shortage in required skills, improved morale,
and other aspects may be of more benefit than the direct
savings. Yet these savings and improvements could not have
been achieved without the factor of dapreciation which
permitted capital accumulation.
The Bureau of Engraving and Printing suffered prior
to 1 July 1951 in the same manner as other Government agencies
by inability to obtain appropriations for replacement of
equipment. Prior to 1951 the Bureau had been funded on the
basis of appropriations and reimbursements from other
agencies. Such reimbursements were not adequate, however,
to the needs of the Bureau. The obligation accounting and
appropriation funding in effect restricted management control
and incentive to plan. Released from such restrictions, the
Bureau now predicates plans in a capital budget (though it is
not so identified) projected two to three years in advance.
Some long-range planning, similar to that of many industries,
has been projected 12 years in advance. Whether or not such
planning is ever executed, it is important as a base line
from which actual performance, as well as other shorter
range plans, may be evaluated.
One problem that the Bureau does not have to face is
that of idle plant capacity. It operates at full capacity,
utilizing shift work, and old equipment to meet demands. In
this sense the Bureau's situation is quite different from
that of defense industrial organizations which achieve full
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capacity only under conditions of mobilization. There is
no basis however to assume that the problems of the Bureau
are simple, in comparison with military industrial organi-
zations. Although it is smaller, it has problems in
technology, accuracy, quality control, security and pro-
duction scheduling that find few counterparts in Defense.
Military industrial fund administrators can find much of
interest and value in the Bureau's operations. The Controller's
organization, programs, and policies are exemplary in
simplicity of form, administration and control. Indeed, the
Bureau of Engraving and Printing is a near-perfect example
of the application of business-like operations in Government
under a revolving fund.
There is no reason why military industrial activities
should not enjoy similar managerial control over funds.
I
CHAPTER IX
THE WEIGHT OF OUTSIDE OPINION
The Second Hoover Commission
The application of depreciation as an element of cost
In Government enterprise has been endorsed by the second
Hoover Commission. The task force which Investigated the
budgeting and accounting practices of the Federal Government
made the following statement relative to property accounting:
Costs of capital assets used in industrial -and
-
commercial -type installations should be depreciated over
their useful lives and the resulting periodic depreciation
charges included as an element of operating cost.l
The report also notes that:
Accounting and reporting systems must be responsive to
the needs of management. This requires that they be
designed to show the results of operations as they
apply to organizational units.
2
The inadequacies of budgeting, accounting and financial
control are repeatedly emphasized. Better financial manage-
ment, and management's need for facts is the theme of the
report. There appears to be some misconception within the
Task Force as to where this management exists or is to be
exercised. Commenting on Revolving Funds, the only real
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government; Budget and Accounting—A Report to the






business-like innovation in Government funding, the Report
states:
The principal disadvantages of these revolving funds
are that they minimize Congressional control of agency
operations, and that their widespread use can result in
too many pockets of funds which become cumbersome from
the standpoint of efficient administration.
3
Pursuing this theme. Chapter IV of the Report entitled
"Restoration of Congressional Control of the Purse" notes
that "the use of working capital funds creates a segment of
Government spending which under present procedures escapes
effective Congressional review."^
Nothing could be farther from the truth, but the
Task Force must be excused for many reasons. In the first
place, the Task Force labored under an obvious misconception
as to the role of Congress. Congress is not a body to "control
agency operations." Congress controls policy, funds, functions,
even the life or death of an agency, but never operations.
Indeed it is unlikely that the Congress would ever seek the
management responsibility of operations in executive agencies
nor does the Constitution provide for it.
Secondly, it is apparent that the Task Force members
were unfamiliar with revolving fund operations in Government.
Revolving funds do not establish "too many pockets of funds
which become cumbersome from the standpoint of efficient
administration." This of course presumes that the admin-







Be that as It may, the techniques of budgeting and
accounting endorsed by the Task Force are sound, even if
some of the editorial comment is not. At the time of the
investigation, revolving fund operations were too new and
too few to provide an adequate basis for conclusions.
The Cooper Committee
Depreciation as an applied element of cost in defense
activities is also supported by the "Report of the Industrial
Activities Working Group" of the Cooper Committee. This
Committee, headed by Mr. Charles P. Cooper was officially
established as the "Advisory Committee on Fiscal Organization
and Procedures" by the Secretary of Defense in 1953. Like
the Hoover Commission, working groups were established to
investigate various general areas under the frame of reference
Their work was thorough, penetrating, and sound. As a
result the report shows understanding, common sense, and
professional competence in its recommendations for military
management. An example of this is the following comment:
5
In a very important sense, correct product costing is
more important to the Defense Department than it is to
private industry. The latter has an automatic check on
its costs in the competitively determined sales prices
which it must meet . . . this places even more stress
on the need of being right in the cost calculations of
industrial establishments lest erroneous data guides top
management ....
Correct production costing cannot be achieved without
inclusion of the following excluded costs:
^Report of the Industrial Activities Working Group,
Advisory Committee on Fiscal Organization and Procedures,
Office of the Secretary of Defense. July 195^ pp. 15~51.
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a. free issue material
b. military pay and allowances
c. depreciation
d. employee fringe benefits
e. others
Addressing itself to the matter of depreciation the Committee
as a whole adopted the following stand:
1. Depreciation accounting should not be employed
with respect to (a) weapons and other military items,
including ships, aircraft, and combat vehicles, and
(b) fixed assets used in carrying out military missions,
or in the general administration of the Department,
including buildings, equipment and other facilities,
except as provided below.
2. Depreciation accounting should be employed with
respect to (a) industrial and commercial activities, and
(b) construction equipment and other facilities consumed
in the process of construction where depreciation charges
constitute a significant element of cost. Depreciation
accounting should be applied to the entire production
plant, i.e., buildings, machinery and equipment in
industrial and commercial activities. Moreover,
depreciation charges should be used as a factor in
determining the price of the product or service. It
would be advantageous for recoveries attributable to
depreciation charges for machinery and equipment (but
not for buildings) to be made available as a source of
financing for the continuity of machinery and equipment,
subject to appropriate safeguards such as approved by
higher authority, and necessary legislative authority
to this end should be sought. In the absence of such
authority or inability to obtain it, such recoveries
should be transferred to general receipts of the Treasury
along with the recoveries related to depreciation of
buildings.
3. A flexible approach to depreciation accounting
be employed with respect to service facilities such as
hospitals, warehouse equipment, commercial vehicles, etc.
Such factors as the extent to which cost data may
contribute to management decisions through a choice of
alternatives, the extent that costs are controllable,
and other similar factors, including the alternative of
periodic studies based on estimates or the use of








In analyzing this statement relative to paragraph
number 2 dealing with industrial activities, two pre-
dominant weaknesses are evident. The first of these is the
inclusion of buildings in depreciation accounting. The
second is the proposal to transfer recovered depreciation
charges to the Treasury.
The purpose of depreciation is to maintain a con-
tinuous replacement program of plant equipment. This purpose
can be reasonably carried out through a budget with Con-
gressional approval. The replacement of buildings is another
matter, and is clearly a province of public works that is
subject to Congressional interest and control. From an
accounting standpoint, inclusion of buildings, or even land
in a depreciation program is valid. Prom a practical stand-
point (i.e., practical in the light of Congressional history),
it is not valid. Likewise, return of receipts to the
Treasury would serve no military administrative or management
purpose. It would only make military costs higher in the
sense of double appropriations—increased operating
appropriations and continued appropriations for industrial
facilities. Neither would benefits accrue to the taxpayer,
since his tax rate is predicated on government expenditures
rather than the balance in the Treasury.
In spite of these weaknesses, which were probably
appreciated by the Committee, the endorsement of depreciation
as an element of production costs should carry considerable
weight and influence in the councils of Defense.




concluded that depreciation is a proper element of cost in
productive government enterprise. The Second Hoover
Commission and the Cooper Committee were both staffed with
outstanding men in their fields. Thoroughly schooled in
private enterprise, with a wealth of experience in top
management, these two groups reached essentially the same
conclusions. These conclusions coincide with those held by
many in the Department of Defense, both military and civilian.
On this basis it would appear that those in authority would
be able to proceed confidently and expeditiously on matters






It has been said that all machinery is on an
irresistable march to the junk heap, and while its progress
may be delayed, it cannot be prevented by repairs. This
statement can be thoroughly appreciated by military industrial
managers who have been fighting physical deterioration of
their plants in the only way they can by means of repairs
and maintenance. The Industrial Fund Regulations provide
for accruals for maintenance, but not for replacement of
capital equipment. The omission of depreciation provisions
is an anachronism in the otherwise advanced financial manage-
ment concepts embodied in the Industrial Funds. Even the
railroad industry abandoned the "maintenance in lieu of
depreciation" theory years ago. It does not work satis-
factorily, and is unsound from any viewpoint that may be
chosen. There is no substitute for the depreciation concept
in the management of an enterprise utilizing fixed assets.
Within the Government there is no real basis for argument
on this matter, particularly when the Government engages in
business-like operations. Obviously there would be no
purpose in depreciating the Washington Monument; likewise,
there would be no purpose in depreciating military weapons.
However, for the purpose of rletermining the cost of work in




the turn of the century, depreciation is an essential factor
among others.
There are some legitimate considerations that may be
weighed against depreciation funding. The first of these
is the accounting effort involved, the difficulty of which
will depend on the method used. On the other hand with the
extensive amount of accounting already required by law, the
additional effort will be negligible in relation to the total.
Another consideration is the management control over
depreciation reserves, and the possibility of diversion of
such reserves for other purposes by higher authority. It
would seem essential that control of depreciation reserves
be vested in the management agency concerned such as a
technical Bureau or Corps. With regard to diversion of
reserves by higher authority such as the Bureau of the Budget
or the Department of Defense, any violation of the integrity
of the Industrial Fund Systejn, will spark other authorities
to rectify the matter. A third consideration is that consumer
appropriations will be adversely affected by virtue of higher
costs resulting from depreciation. This concern is easily
resolved by reflecting such higher costs in consumer budget
submissions, with appropriate justifications. Further, as
noted earlier, such increases due to depreciation will be
small percentagewise and will be compensated to some extent
by increased efficiency and lower production costs. Thus
each of the considerations noted can be counter-balanced. In
addition, various applications of the depreciation concept
to non-military Government enterprises, show that it can be
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done successfully, without development of the adverse con-
siderations noted. As for the viewpoints that depreciation
is not appropriate to military industrial enterprise, and
that military costs should not be compared to those of
private industry, they can be dismissed as unrealistic and
strictly parochial. Cost comparisons are inevitable, and
the concept of depreciation is applicable to all business
enterprise, private or military.
Considerations in favor of depreciation funding in
the military industrial funds are manifold. The first and
foremost perhaps is simply that it makes good business
sense. How can an accounting system have any real use or
validity if such an important element as depreciation is
omitted? Secondly, since the Congress expressly desires
cost control, performance budgeting and business-like
procedures, what military postulate can support continued
resistance to these legitimate and sound objectives?
Thirdly, if full managerial control of military industrial
activities is to be exercised on the basis of the financial
autonomy afforded by the Industrial Funds, full implementation
of the funding capabilities must be developed.
The chief advantage of depreciation funding in military
industrial activities is the opportunity it would afford to
replace old equipment and maintain a reasonable degree of
modernization. The secondary advantages include:
1. The development of managerial competence and
re spon sibility
.
2. The improvement of financial and cost accounting
<»
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data in military industrial activities.
3. Potential savings due to increased efficiency
of new equipment.
4. Fringe benefits in the area of training and morale
of personnel concerned with equipment utilization.
5. Clarification and equalization of the cost
burden between producer and consumer activities.
6. Clarification of the problem area involving
idle plant capacity, active plant capacity., and reserve or
mobilization plant capacity.
7. Delineation and clarification of military
Industrial missions and activities.
These advantages will materialize through the
medium of the budget., with its inherent coercive elements
of planning, coordination, and control. By this means
concern for Congressional control of the purse will be
allayed, and management control will grow, at both the
Washington and local levels.
With respect to more specific conclusions and
recommendations for the implementation of the depreciation
funding in military industrial activities, the following are
offered:
a. Depreciation of machinery and equipment should
be recognized as an element of cost in military Industrial
Fund activities.
b. Depreciation costs should be funded, and the




c. Expenditure of depreciation reserves should be
controlled through a capital budget sponsored by the manage-
ment agency. Such a capital budget would be subject to the
review of higher fiscal authority, and the Congress.
d. Depreciation reserves should have statutory
protection from confiscation or diversion to other purposes
by authority other than Congress.
e. Depreciation should be applied not as a blanket
program, but to meet the specific requirements or the nature
of the operations involved.
It is hoped that this study may be of some assistance
in illuminating the problem of depreciation as applied to
military industrial activities, as v/ell as in other Government
enterprises. It is also hoped that in some small way, this






A LIST OF AGENCY ABBREVIATIONS
BUBUD The Bureau of the Budget
BUAER The Bureau of Aeronautics
BUDOCKS .... The Bureau of Yards and Docks
BUMED The Eureau of Medicine and Surgery
EUORD The Bureau of Ordnance
BUSANDA. . . . The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
BUSHIPS .... The Bureau of Ships
DOD The Department of Defense
OPNAV The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
ODM The Office of Defense Mobilization
NAVCOMP .... The Office of the Comptroller of the Navy





85th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION
IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES
July 19 (legislative day, July 8), 1957
MR. SPARKMAN (for himself and Mr. Thye) introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on Armed Services
A BILL
To authorize the employment of working capital
funds in the procurement and replacement of durable
productive equipment.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled. That working capital funds established
pursuant to section 405 of title IV of the National
Security Act of 19^7, as amended (63 Stat. 587 ) t may
be charged with the cost of machine tools and other
durable productive equipment, and may be reimbursed
with: (i) rentals received from private contractors
for the use of Government -owned machine tools or other
durable productive equipment; (ii) price concessions
or similar credits or allowances received by the Govern-
ment from private contractors in lieu of rentals for the
use of Government -owned machine tool 3 or other durable
productive equipment; and (iii) charges or allowances
for deprecation and obsolescence on Government-owned
machine tools or other durable productive equipment in
arsenals, depots, factories, and similar installations.




PUBLIC LAW 656 - 81 st CONGRESS
CHAPTER 558 - 2d SESSION
s. 3653
AN ACT
To provide for financing the operations of the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing, Treasury Department, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That whenever any work or services are requi-
sitioned from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Treasury
Department (hereinafter referred to as the "Bureau ), the
requisitioning agency shall make payment therefor from funds
available to it for such purposes at prices deemed by the
Secretary of the Treasury (hereinafter referred to as the
!! Secretary" ) to be adequate to recover the amount of direct
and indirect costs of the Bureau, including its administrative
expenses, incidental to performing the work or services
requisitioned. Requisitioning agencies shall make payment
to the Bureau promptly on the. basis of bills rendered bj the
Bureau.
SEC. 2. (a) There is hereby established, as of July 1,
1951* a Bureau of Engraving and Printing Fund (hereinafter
referred to as the "fund"). The fund shall be capitalized
on the basis of -
(1) an initial appropriation by the Congress to the
fund of not to exceed $5,000,000 and such
additional amounts as from time to time may
be appropriated for the purposes of the fund, which
suras are hereby authorized to be appropriated
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated;
(2) all of the receivables and the inventories and
other physical assets of the Bureau as of the
close of business June 30* 1951* exclusive of
buildings occupied, land, and the unexpended
balances of appropriations made to the Bureau,
such inventories and other physical assets to be
capitalized at fair and reasonable values to be




(3) assumption by the fund of all of the
liabilities of the Bureau as of the close of
business on June 30, 1951.
(b) The fund shall assume all of the obligations and
other commitments of the Bureau outstanding as of
the close of business on June 30* 1951.
(c) The fund shall include all property and other
physical assets acquired by the Bureau except
buildings and land, all amounts recoverable as
provided in section 1 for the costs of work and
services performed by the Bureau, and all other
amounts receivable by the Bureau from whatever
sources derived, including all proceeds arising
from disposition of any property or other assets
acquired by the fund.
(d) The fund shall be available without fiscal -year
limitation for financing all costs and expenses
of operating and maintaining the Bureau subsequent
to June 30, 1951.
(e) Any surplus accruing to the fund in any fiscal year
shall be paid into the general fund of the Treasury
as miscellaneous receipts during the ensuing fiscal
year: Provided, That any such surplus may be
applied first to restore any impairment of the
capital of the fund by reason of variations
between the prices charged for work or services
and the amount determined to be the actual cost
of performing such work or services.
(f
)
A special deposit account for the fund shall be
established with the Treasurer of the United
States. The special deposit account shall be
credited with the sums made available by appropriations
authorized in this Act and with all receipts of
the Bureau without the covering of such' receipts
into the Treasury. The balance in the special
deposit account shall be available for making
disbursements authorized on behalf of the fund
in accordance with the Act of December 29, 19^1
(55 Stat. 875) j as amended, through the disbursing
facilities of the Treasury Department.
SEC. 3. The unexpended balances of all appropriations
made to the Bureau for the fiscal years 1950 and 1951 shall
lapse on June 30, 1951* and shall be transferred immediately
to the surplus fund of the Treasury.
SEC. 4. The Secretary shall prepare and submit an
annual business-type budget program for the Bureau.
*I
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SEC. 5. There shall be Installed and maintained In
the Bureau an Integrated system of accounting, Including
proper features of Internal control, which will (a) assure
adequate control over all assets and liabilities of the fund;
(b) develop accurate direct and indirect costs of production
of the Bureau for making recoveries of such costs on the
basis of work requisitioned; (c) make provision for replace-
ment of capitalized equipment and other fixed assets
through the maintenance of adequate depreciation reserves
based on original cost or on appraised values as authorized
in section 2 (a) (2); (d) afford full disclosure with
respect to the financial condition and operations of the
fund according to the accrual method of accounting; and
(e) supply on the basis of accounting results the data for
the annual budget of the Bureau with respect to the last
completed fiscal year. The system of accounting shall
conform to principles and standards prescribed by the
Comptroller General of the United States to accomplish the
purposes of this section, and shall be subject to such
review by the Comptroller General as may be necessary to
assure its conformance with the principles and standards
prescribed and its effectiveness in operation.
SEC. 6. The financial transactions, accounts, and
reports of the fund shall be audited on an annual basis
by the General Accounting Office and a copy of each report
on audit shall be furnished promptly to the President, the
Congress, and the Secretai
SEC. 7. Any power or authority conferred upon the
Secretary by this Act may be delegated by him to any officer
or employee of the Treasury Department.
SEC. 8. (a) Section 1 of the Act entitled ?t An Act
making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Govern-
ment for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen
hundred and ninety -eight, and for other purposes", approved
June 4, 1897 > is amended by striking out the first proviLO
contained in the third paragraph under the caption "Engraving
and Printing " (30 Stat. 18; 31 U.S.C. 178),
(b) Section 1 of the Act entitled "An Act making
appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the
Government for the fiscal year ending June
thirtieth, eighteen hundred and eighty -seven, and
for other purposes," approved August 4, 1886,
is amended by striking out the proviso contained
in the third paragraph under the caption "Engraving
and Printing" (24 Stat. 227; 31 U.S.C. 176).
(c) In the case of all other laws or parts of laws
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act,
the provisions of this Act shall govern.
(d) This Act shall take effect on July 1, 1951.
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